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Abstract 
 
 In the view of a missing consensus on how corruption relates to firm 
innovation, this paper empirically studies the relationship between petty corruption 
and product, process, marketing and organizational innovations in post-Soviet 
region. Exploiting cross-sectional firm-level data from the fifth round of Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS V), the paper finds that 
bribery increases the probability of introducing all four innovation types in the overall 
post-Soviet region. Considering variations in institutional development levels, the 
paper distinguishes three clusters of countries within the region respect to the quality 
of institutional structures based on Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) data of 
World Bank. Results reveal that bribery “greases the wheels” of only organizational 
innovation in the countries with strong institutional environment. The paper suggests 
that while the quality of institutions are good enough to prevent using bribery as a 
tool to foster product, process and marketing innovations, there is still room for 
improving institutions concerning organizational innovation. In the countries with 
moderate institutions, the correlation between bribery and product innovation is 
positive and statistically significant. Institutions concerning product innovations 
ought to be strengthened in this country cluster. Similar to the overall post-Soviet 
region, bribery encourages all four innovation types in the countries with weak 
institutional structures. So, fight against corruption needs to be braced and 
institutions should be improved to adhere global standards in order to halt 
corruption’s positive link to firm innovation. 
 
Keywords: corruption, bribery, firm innovation, product innovation, process 
innovation, marketing innovation, organizational innovation, institutions, post-Soviet 
region. 
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1. Introduction  
Today’s business world challenges a company’s capacity to sustain 
competitive advantage more than ever due to constant technological advances, 
shorter lifecycle of products and technologies, and globalization of markets which 
increases the rate of rivalry (Dadfar et al., 2013). In such a globalized economic 
world, competition becomes more dynamic and innovation is seen as one of the key 
drivers of competitive advantage by small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
which play an important role in the economy of every country at national level (Nie, 
2007). In order to outperform others in the market and sustain competitive 
advantage, companies must take the advantage of latest technological innovations 
and continuously develop and improve products and processes (Hitt et al., 2001). 
Innovation also enables firms to effectively align resources with market opportunities 
and address customer needs more efficiently (Rujirawanich et al., 2011).  
The environment in which a firm operates can affect its innovation capability 
and performance. Institutional factors constitute a subset of such influential 
environmental factors (Bayarçelik et al., 2014). For example, political and economic 
instability, lack of regulations on intellectual property (IP) rights, non-compliance with 
contracts are attributes of an environment with a weak institutional structure and may 
hinder innovation performance of firms (Volchek et al., 2013). Inefficient regulations 
may cause time-consuming exercises for SMEs and increase transaction costs of 
introducing innovation. A well-regulated business environment, on the contrary, 
results in economic development and prosperity. Efficient business regulations lead 
to less bureaucratic procedures and allow firms to operate more effectively by 
reducing transaction costs (Breen & Gillanders, 2012).    
One of the indicators of poor institutional quality is corruption. Institutional 
structure can be weak because corrupt public officials may not be interested in 
designing good regulations in order to extract more bribes in future (Andvig & Moene, 
1990). Likewise, public agents may not be interested in enforcing laws in order to 
have an opportunity of receiving bribes. For instance, regulators may be offered 
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bribes by a monopolist to prevent its competitors from entering the market by 
creating artificial obstacles (Breen & Gillanders, 2012). 
So far, many studies have been devoted to analyzing corruption’s impact on 
economic growth (d’Agostino et al., 2016; Del Monte & Papagni, 2001; Gyimah-
Brempong, 2002; P. Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001). However, only small attention has 
been given to its impact on firm innovation as an institutional manner. Moreover, 
conclusions of conducted studies are not uniform. In the literature, there exist two 
major conflicting views about the impact of corruption on innovation.  
The first view is referred to as the “sand the wheel effect” of corruption on 
innovation and supports conventional wisdom which indicates a negative 
relationship between the two. According to this view, corruption is a deterrent for 
businesses as it creates additional expenses, leads to misallocation of resources, 
reduces investments in research and development (R&D) and innovation activities, 
and weakens trust (DiRienzo & Das, 2015; Lee et al., 2020; Mahagaonkar, 2010; P. 
Mauro, 1995; Waldemar, 2012). Second view, on the other hand, is known as the 
“grease the wheel” effect of corruption on innovation and suggests that petty 
corruption, bribery and/or other types of informal payments in small amounts may 
facilitate firm innovation by means of “getting things done”. For example, bribery can 
help businesses to secure contracts, obtain licenses and permissions, remove small 
barriers to operate and so on (Krastanova, 2014; Nguyen et al., 2016; Taha, 2016; 
Vial & Hanoteau, 2010). 
Hence, no common view about the impact of corruption on firm innovation 
has been established so far. Phenomena regarding understanding the underlying 
relationship is either studying countries particularly or conducting a cross-country 
study for a group of countries that have geographical, economical and/or historical 
ties, and hence making generalization. 
Post-Soviet region is considered as one of the most corrupt regions in the 
world. Roots of corruption had deepened in the region over 70 years of Soviet 
regime. According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency 
International, only Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Georgia have good 
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rankings and are the least corrupt countries of the region. This can be reasoned by 
significantly different governance standards of Baltic states compared to the rest of 
the countries, and Georgia’s more positive attitude towards integration to the 
European Union (EU) and Western world. While Belarus and Armenia are more 
corrupt, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Russia, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan are the most corrupt countries in the former communist region 
(Transparency International, 2019). Although governments take actions and 
introduce new regulations to cope with corruption, efficiency and results of such 
activities are different due to a high degree of heterogeneity in the former communist 
region (FSU). For example, while Azerbaijan falls behind Armenia and Georgia in 
CPI ranking (Transparency International, 2019), it scores better than the two in 
economic development and global competitiveness (Korganashvili et al., 2017). On 
the other hand, the easiest country to start and do a business among the three is 
Georgia followed by Azerbaijan, while Armenia scores the worst (World Bank Group, 
2020).   
Hence, studying the relationship between corruption and firm innovation in 
the FSU region is very interesting considering the legacy of a totalitarian past, 
strategically important geolocation and a high degree of heterogeneity in terms of 
labor force, natural resources, political atmosphere and institutional structures. 
To the author's knowledge, however, the relationship between corruption and 
firm innovation has been overlooked in the FSU. Empirical studies have been 
conducted for wider sets of transition countries (i.e., Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern 
Europe) which induces a question about the extent to which the results can be 
generalized for the post-Soviet region. Therefore, this thesis aims to contribute to 
the literature by studying how bribery, defined as a form of corruption, relates to firm 
innovation in the post-Soviet states – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan is excluded from the scope of the FSU region, 
because there is no data available for this country in the used dataset. Even though 
various classifications of innovation exist, in this thesis, the author refers to “OSLO 
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Manual: Guidelines for collecting and interpreting innovation data” framework which 
distinguishes four types of innovation, namely product, process, marketing and 
organizational innovations. 
Secondly, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study for the 
region that systematically analyzes the link between bribery and all four types of 
innovation - product, process, marketing and organizational innovations. In this 
sense, this work also adds to the limited literature by covering marketing and 
organizational innovations besides product and process innovations. 
The next chapter of the thesis reviews the relevant literature. It is followed by 
the “Data and Methodology” section, where the dataset used to conduct the research 
is described and methodology behind the econometric model is explained. Empirical 
analysis and results are described in Chapter 4. Eventually, Conclusion, References 
and Appendices are provided as separate sections.   
 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Innovation, Firms and Economic Growth 
 Corruption and innovation play an important role in economic growth. Starting 
with innovation, it increases competition in the market which leads to higher 
productivity and better financial performance of firms and through them to a 
sustainable economic growth (Phillippe Aghion & Howitt, 1990; Grossman & 
Helpman, 1991; Hall et al., 2009; Pece et al., 2015; Romer, 1990). 
  
2.2. Institutions and Corruption 
2.2.1. Institutions 
 In the innovation-firm productivity-economic growth link, the role of institutions 
needs to be taken under consideration. Institutions are defined as “the formal and 
informal rules that organize social, political and economic relations”. While formal 
institutions refer to the law, regulations and constitution imposed by the government, 
informal institutions refer to norms and values of the society (North, 1990). Studies 
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provide evidence to the important role of institutions in economic development and 
growth (Djankov et al., 2006; Gillanders & Whelan, 2010), innovation (Tebaldi & 
Elmslie, 2008) and higher productivity (Philippe Aghion et al., 2009; Barseghyan, 
2008). Overall, while poor quality of institutions is seen as a deterrent for a firm’s 
innovation performance (Volchek et al., 2013), an effectively regulated environment 
fosters innovation activities of businesses and improves the well-being of society. 
The latter positive effect is observed because the business environment becomes 
much more stable when laws are enforced constantly and effectively. In addition to 
that, if distributive, representative and accountability functions of institutions perform 
well, an efficient communication among government bodies, which design and 
implement the regulations, is assured. This, in turn, leads to a much more optimal 
business environment (Breen & Gillanders, 2012). 
 
 
2.2.2. Corruption as an Institutional Problem 
 Corruption has several definitions. Commonly, it is referred to as “the misuse 
of resources or power for private gain which contravenes the rules of the game (Jain, 
2001; Transparency International, n.d.). Bribery is one of the forms of corruption and 
is defined as “the act of dishonestly persuading someone to act in one’s favor by a 
payment or other inducement, such as gifts, loans, fees, rewards or other 
advantages (e.g., taxes, services, donations). The use of bribes can lead to collusion 
(e.g. inspectors under-reporting offences in exchange for bribes) and/or extortion 
(e.g. bribes extracted against the threat of over-reporting)” (Why Corruption Matters: 
Understanding Causes, Effects and How to Address Them, n.d.-a).  
 Corruption can be both a symptom and a cause of a weak institutional 
structure. As an example of being a symptom, it can be mentioned that in an over 
regulated environment with a high degree of bureaucracy, corruption gives an 
opportunity to firms to engage in economically beneficial activities and “get things 
done” (Zimmermann, 2007). 
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 On the other hand, some studies see corruption as one of the main causes of 
weak institutional structures. They claim that it is not always only a lack of 
understanding of good policies that leads to poor quality of institutional structures. In 
order to increase the opportunity of extracting bribes, public agents may not be 
interested in establishing strong institutions and enforcing regulations (Coolidge, 
1999; Krueger, 1993, 2002). 
 Corruption reveals its impacts at both macro and micro economic levels. 
Despite the difficulty of measuring corruption, a considerable amount of research 
has considered its impacts at the macroeconomic level. Mauro was the pioneer to 
study the empirical impact of corruption on economic growth. Though in his first 
study, the underlying impact was found to be statistically insignificant (P. Mauro, 
1995), he found a statistically significant negative effect of corruption on per capita 
income growth rate by using a larger set of data afterwards (M. P. Mauro, 1996).   
 While some research reports also positive impacts of corruption at 
macroeconomic level, in overall, studies suggest that corruption creates additional 
expenses to obtain services which are free of charge normally. Businesses face 
uncertainties emerging due to corruption and lower their investments which hinders 
growth (Why Corruption Matters: Understanding Causes, Effects and How to 
Address Them, n.d.-b). Supporting this view, a recent paper conducts a systematic 
review by analyzing 55 empirical studies devoted to macroeconomic impacts of 
corruption and concludes that one unit increase in CPI decreases GDP per capita 
growth rate by 0.12 percentage. Indirect impact of corruption, measured by public 
financial revenue flows and human capital level, is found to be even stronger and 
attributed to -0.29% (Ugur & Dasgupta, 2011). 
 At the microeconomic level, corruption’s impacts are explained from individual 
and firm behavioral aspects. For instance, an individual may favor engaging in 
corrupt activities due to apparent benefits of them compared to fair economic 
activities. So that firms may be pushed to develop incompetent production models 
due to avoiding doing business in corrupt industries (Coolidge, 1999; Svensson, 
2005). 
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2.2.3. Corruption in Post-Soviet Countries 
 In the FSU region, there is a misperception of corruption in the society. 
Typically, people refer to “grand corruption” which happens on large scales as the 
“true” corruption and denounce it. However, petty corruption which helps to “get 
things done” in daily life is widely tolerated by people. For example, according to 
(Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000), people who do not use state services for medical 
treatment in Russia, the successor of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR), are more willingly to get private treatment in illegal ways rather than paying 
for it officially. Commonly, petty corruption is not perceived to be “true” corruption by 
the FSU societies and even considered necessary for the functioning of the system 
(Bowser, 2017; Habibov et al., 2017).  
 It is important here to distinguish Baltics from the rest of the region countries. 
Due to their close ties with Scandinavian countries, which rank in the top 10 respect 
to CPI, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have significant differences than the rest in 
terms of ethical practices. EU, NATO and OECD memberships in case of Estonia 
and Latvia helped Baltic states to effectively introduce institutional reforms and 
establish free market economies, democratic political atmosphere and strong law 
enforcement. Officials in the Baltic region are also less likely to take bribes rather 
than the rest of the FSU countries (Sanyal & Samanta, 2017). 
 Despite being classified as more and the most corrupt countries of the FSU 
(Transparency International, 2019), Georgia, Moldova and Armenia show significant 
efforts in fighting against corruption. In addition to local governments’ actions to cope 
with corruption, underlying countries benefit from The Eastern Partnership program 
which is a joint initiative between member states and the EU aiming to build “a 
common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability and increased cooperation” 
(European External Action Service, 2016). As a result, institutional qualities of these 
countries are of moderate quality (see section 3.1). Policy reforms introduced by 
official bodies reveal positive outcomes in these countries’ business environments, 
as well. For example, according to the Ease of Doing Business report of 2019, 
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Georgia leaves behind even Baltic states and positions at 6th place out of 190 
countries. Armenia and Moldova  also position among the first 50 countries in the 
ranking (World Bank Group, 2020). 
 Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan are also among more and the most corrupt countries of the region. 
Moreover, first three countries are also members of The Eastern European 
Partnership. However, despite this program and actions taken to fight against 
corruption, all these eight countries are attributed to weak institutional structures (see 
section 3.1). Although it relates to the efficiency of actions taken against corruption 
by local governments, initial levels of institutions also matter. As seen from Figure 1, 
initial level of institutions was the best for Baltic states in 1996. Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan had and still have the worst institutions in the region. While institutions 
stood more or less at the same level for other countries at initial point, there is an 
impressive continuous progress by Georgia since 2002.   
 
  
2.3. Corruption and Innovation 
 All in all, although innovation and corruption are key determinants of 
economic development and growth, as seen from above, the conclusion on the 
relationship between innovation and corruption is not consistent and splitted into two 
conflicting hypotheses. 
 
 
2.3.1. “Sanding the Wheels of Innovation” Effect of Corruption  
 One of them is the “Sanding the wheels of innovation” hypothesis that sees 
corruption as a hindrance for innovation due to several reasons. Hierarchical 
structure of the bureaucracy is presented as one of those reasons. Some actors of 
this hierarchical structure may create artificial barriers for businesses to get bribes. 
Unnecessary delays in processes, for instance, granting licenses, could be an 
example of such barriers. In this case, businesses face a dilemma of either 
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undertaking the cost of bribery and accomplishing innovation activities, or avoiding 
the costs of bribery at all. While the first case reduces investments in innovative 
activities, the second case vanishes such activities at all. Hence, firm innovation gets 
negatively impacted in either way (Myrdal, 1968). 
 Supporting this argument, another study suggests that public officials 
sometimes can act unwillingly in controlling corruption in order not to lose their illegal 
incomes. In the long run, it can result in a much corrupt environment where additional 
expenses of businesses, in the form of bribery, are increased significantly. 
Innovation activities of firms would get hurt in this case, consequently (Kurer, 1993). 
Apart from that, corruption causes uncertainty and less predictability in the business. 
As bribery, informal payments are against the rule of laws of all countries, there is 
no corruption deal where the terms and agreements are specified in detail, and the 
side which terminates the agreement carries legal responsibility for its behavior. 
Hence, innovation as an outcome of such deals is never guaranteed (Luo, 2005). 
 A number of empirical studies support the “Sanding the wheels of innovation” 
hypothesis of corruption. Relevant to our focus region, there is a recent paper which 
utilizes firm-level data from BEEPS, launched in 2008, to examine the effects of 
transnational corruption on host country firms’ innovation behavior and performance 
in transition economies, where the FSU region is also partially in the scope. The 
study distinguishes grand corruption in government contracts and practices of petty 
corruption. It suggests that when the proportion of foreign firms involved in grand 
corruption increases, R&D investments in host countries fall down relatively and 
product innovation is hindered. On the other hand, foreign petty corruption is found 
to positively affect product innovation, however this effect also tends to decrease 
when the level of corruption gets higher. The research also suggests that foreign 
firms’ engagement in corrupt activities decreases the likelihood of the host country’s 
ability to introduce new products and services in the long-term (Habiyaremye & 
Raymond, 2018).    
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 The negative impact of corruption on product and organizational innovations 
was identified in context of African firms, as well (Goedhuys et al., 2016; 
Mahagaonkar, 2010).  
 
 
2.3.2. “Greasing the Wheels of Innovation” Effect of Corruption 
 “Greasing the wheels of innovation” hypothesis, on the contrary, argues that 
corruption can make innovation more likely to happen, particularly in case of 
underdeveloped and transition countries where institutional weaknesses are 
present. For example, using data of 7000 firms from 30 transition economies 
including the states of the South Caucasus, (Krammer, 2013) suggests that firms 
use bribery as a tool to minimize uncertainties, bypass institutional and bureaucratic 
barriers in order to bring innovation into the market. Moreover, the study argues that 
bribe efficiency is mitigated by the quality of existing institutions, being both formal 
(control of corruption) and informal (trust) institutions (Krammer, 2013).  
 Similarly, (Xie et al., 2019) finds a positive link between corruption and new 
product innovation by using World Bank Enterprise Survey’s panel data from 27 
transition countries, partially including the FSU region, collected in 2012. The 
positive impact is found to be statistically significant at 1%. Authors explain this 
impact by weak institutional structures which reveal in the forms of policy instability 
and uncertainty, and threats of informal competition. In such circumstances, 
companies use corruption to overcome the increasing informal competitive pressure, 
bureaucratic red tape and government inefficiency.  
 All in all, it appears that while there exists enough literature studying 
innovation and corruption as determinants of economic growth, relationship between 
the former two is relatively neglected and only a limited number of inconclusive 
studies has been conducted so far. Completed studies have yet to reach a 
theoretical consensus, whereas empirical results demonstrate that both “greasing” 
and “sanding” effects of corruption on innovation are possible, depending on the 
strength level of local institutions, forms of corruption and types of innovation. 
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Considering this in the view of limited studies which neglect process, marketing and 
organizational innovations for the post-Soviet region, this paper contributes to the 
literature by arguing on the relationship between bribery and product, process, 
market and organizational innovations in the mentioned geographical area.   
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
 Cross-sectional firm-level data from the fifth round of Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), which was implemented by European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development in partnership with the World Bank, is 
used to conduct the study.  
 BEEPS is intended to capture business perceptions of biggest environmental 
factors which put obstacles to firm growth, importance of different constraints for 
increasing labor force and productivity, and the impact of a country’s business 
environment on its global competitiveness.  
 BEEPS V was undertaken during the years of 2012-2016, and consists of 
data from 16,566 enterprises in 32 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. It 
used stratified random sampling method and applied this structure in three levels to 
all subjective countries: industry, establishment size and region (BEEPS | 2012-
2016, n.d.).  
 One additional reason why this dataset is suitable for the study is that the fifth 
round of BEEPS introduced a new concept, namely Innovation Module, which 
distinguishes product, process, organizational and marketing innovations. Such 
differentiation is compliant with the classification of innovation by the OSLO Manual. 
 BEEPS dataset is cleaned by excluding “Don’t know”, “Refused”, “DOES NOT 
APPLY” answers from all variables of the estimation strategy. After cleaning, 5227 
responses are left for the focus countries in total. 
 In addition to BEEPS dataset, the paper is elaborated with The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) data of World Bank in order to capture institutional 
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qualities in the region countries. WGI is a panel dataset which consists of aggregate 
and individual governance indicators for more than 200 countries and territories over 
the world for the time period from 1996 to 2018. Considering that BEEPS V was 
conducted during 2012-2016, WGI dataset will also be restricted to the same time 
period in order to ensure data integrity. WGI reports six dimensions of governance, 
namely voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption.  
Standard normal units of these governance indicators in the original WGI dataset 
vary in [-2.5; 2.5]. But to avoid confusion, units of all governance indicators are 
rescaled to vary in the range of [0; 5] with higher values corresponding to better 
governance. After shifting the focus to the post-Soviet region, this range becomes 
[1.3; 3.6]. Considering this, countries of the FSU region are grouped respect to their 
institutional qualities by dividing the latter interval by three. Thus, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan are the 
countries with weak institutional structures in a respective order. Moldova, Armenia 
and Georgia are the countries with moderate institutional quality, whereas Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia have strong institutions and law enforcement. This grouping 
pattern will be followed in the rest of the paper.  
 
 
3.2. Variables 
 There are four different dependent variables corresponding to four types of 
innovation and they are defined as follows: 
 Product innovation is defined as “a good or service that is new or significantly 
improved”. This includes significant improvements in technical specifications, 
components and materials, software in the product, user friendliness or other 
functional characteristics (Oslo Manual, n.d.). So, product innovation is introduced 
by a firm if the answer of the question “During the last three years, has this 
establishment introduced new or significantly improved products or services?” from 
BEEPS is “YES”. 
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 Process innovation is “the implementation of a new or significantly improved 
production or delivery method. This includes significant changes in techniques, 
equipment and/or software” (Oslo Manual, n.d.). BEEPS captures process 
innovation with the question “During the last three years, has this establishment 
introduced any new or significantly improved methods for the production or supply 
of products or services?”. If the answer is “YES”, then process innovation is present. 
 Marketing innovation is “the implementation of a new marketing method 
involving significant changes in product design or packaging, product placement, 
product promotion or pricing” (Oslo Manual, n.d.). If the answer to the question 
“During the last three years, has this establishment introduced new or significantly 
improved marketing methods?” is “YES”, then marketing innovation is relevant to the 
firm. 
 Organizational innovation is the “implementation of a new organizational 
method in the firm’s business practices, workplace organization or external relations” 
(Oslo Manual, n.d.). Answer to the question “During the last three years, has this 
establishment introduced any new or significantly improved organizational or 
management practices or structures?” from BEEPS defines relatedness of 
organizational innovation to a firm. 
 The main explanatory variable of the model is Bribes. It is defined as the 
percentage of total annual sales paid as informal payment/gift. Such measurement 
of bribery is in line with previous studies (Fisman & Svensson, 2007; Mahagaonkar, 
2010; Waldemar, 2012). Other independent variables of the model are informal 
competition, firm size (logs), firm age (logs), foreign ownership, time tax, financial 
limitations, training, education, management’s expertise and female manager.  
 Detailed descriptions of both dependent and all independent variables are 
given in Table 1 under Appendices.   
 Moreover, I follow the approach of (Ashyrov & Masso, 2020) and introduce a 
set of dummy variables for industries according to the ISIC classifications Revision 
3.1: 15–37, 45, 50, 51, 52, 55, 60–64, 72 in order to capture industry-specific effects 
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(United Nations, 2004). A set of country dummies are also included in the model in 
order to capture country-fixed effects. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of the variables. 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Median Min Max 
Dependent variables 
Product Innovation 5,227 0.219 0.414 0 0 1 
Process Innovation 5,227 0.198 0.398 0 0 1 
Organizational Innovation 5,227 0.214 0.410 0 0 1 
Marketing Innovation 5,227 0.228 0.419 0 0 1 
Independent variables 
Bribes (in percentages) 5,227 0.843 3.702 0 0 80 
Informal Competition 5,227 0.152 0.360 0 0 1 
Firm Age (logs) 5,227 2.251 0.736 2.303 0 4.997 
Firm Size (logs) 5,227 3.002 1.196 2.773 0 9.306 
Foreign Ownership 5,227 0.057 0.232 0 0 1 
Time Tax 5,227 14.400 19.991 10 0 100 
Financial Limitations 5,227 0.189 0.392 0 0 1 
Training 5,227 0.372 0.483 0 0 1 
Education 5,227 44.697 31.747 40 0 100 
Management’s Expertise 5,227 14.754 9.601 12 1 60 
Female Manager 5,227 0.356 0.479 0 0 1 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
  
 Table 2 presents summary statistics of dependent and independent variables. 
Out of 5227 observations, 593 firms reported some percentage of bribe. While 4634 
firms reported 0% bribe, maximum percentage of bribe equals to 80. The issue with 
very high percentages of bribes which makes a firm to seem suspicious to be in a 
valid business is addressed in Robustness Checks by removing bribery outliers. 
Meanwhile, the average percentage of bribe for the region is approximately 0.8. 
Domestic firms constitute a larger portion of the dataset. Out of 5227 companies, 
18 
only 298 are foreign-owned. 4929 enterprises are identified as domestic companies. 
It also reveals that almost half of the firm employees are educated. On average, 
44.7% of firms’ employees obtain a university degree. Companies’ top managers 
have approximately 15 years of experience working in the underlying sector. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean bribes per industry in each country group. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 Figure 2 illustrates mean bribes per industry in each country group. Retail is 
the most corrupt industry in both countries with strong and moderate institutions. It 
is followed by transport and telecommunications, and hotel and restaurant industries 
in countries where institutional structures are of high quality. It can also be observed 
that while IT and motor services are corruption-clean industries in the latter country 
cluster, no bribery is reported for hotel and restaurant, IT and transport and 
telecommunications industries in the countries with moderate institutions. On 
contrary, there is no corruption-clean industry in the countries with weak institutional 
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structures. IT is the most corrupt industry being followed by construction, 
manufacturing and wholesale industries in countries in the latter group of countries. 
Hotel and restaurant, and transport and telecommunications industries are reported 
to have roughly the same average percentage of bribes, whereas motor services is 
the least corrupt industry in the countries with poor institutions. In overall, average 
bribery percentages are highest where institutions are bad. 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean bribes per firm ownership in each country group. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
  
 Figure 3 shows that domestic firms tend to pay more bribes on average in 
countries of strong institutional structures. The situation is the other way around in 
countries with moderate institutions where foreign firms pay significantly higher 
percentage of bribe on average. As in Figure 2, firms pay higher bribes in countries 
with poor institutions no matter their ownership type. Average bribe paid by domestic 
firms is slightly higher than that of foreign-owned companies.   
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Figure 4. Innovativeness per industry and per firm size. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 Figure 4 is produced to illustrate mean innovativeness per industry by taking 
firm size into account. Following the definition of (European Commission, 2003), an 
enterprise is considered micro if it employs less than 10 persons, small if it employs 
between 10 and 50 persons, medium-sized if it employs between 50 and 250 
persons and large if it employs 250 or more persons. Firm is considered to be 
innovative if any type of innovation is relative to it. If a firm does not relate to any 
innovation type out of four, then it is not considered as innovative. It reveals that, 
large firms are more innovative in manufacturing, wholesale, construction and retail 
industries in respective order. They are less innovative in motor services and 
transport and telecommunication industries. Interestingly, no innovation has been 
introduced by large firms in the IT and hotel and restaurant industries across the 
region. On the contrary, IT is the most innovative sector among micro, small and 
medium sized enterprises. It is followed by manufacturing and motor services 
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industries for medium sized firms, and by manufacturing and wholesale industries 
for small and micro sized enterprises. 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean innovativeness per firm size in each country group. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
  
 Figure 5 illustrates mean innovativeness per firm size in each country cluster. 
Companies of large and medium sizes are the most innovative firms in all country 
clusters. Small enterprises are the third most innovative enterprises across the 
region. Micro firms are the least innovative firms in the FSU region. One possible 
reason could be that larger firms have more financial means to innovate and their in-
house R&D centers foster innovation. Moreover, small firms have less bureaucracy 
rather than medium-sized firms and it would be easier for them to make changes in 
their business models and come up with innovation.   
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Table 3. Correlation matrix of the variables used in regression analysis.  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Product Innovation 1               
Process Innovation 0.51 1              
Marketing Innovation 0.38 0.43 1             
Organizational 
Innovation 
0.4 0.5 0.6 1           
 
Bribes 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06 1           
Informal Competition 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.1 1          
Firm Age (logs) 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.02 1         
Firm Size (logs) 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.16 -0.03 -0.01 0.28 1        
Foreign Ownership 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.09 0 0.01 0.02 0.17 1       
Time Tax 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.05 0 0.07 0.02 1      
Financial Limitations 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 1     
Training 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.09 0.08 0.05 1    
Education 0.04 0 0.07 0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.17 -0.2 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 1   
Management’s Expertise 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.38 0.14 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.08 -0.08 1  
Female Manager -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 0.03 -0.02 0 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 0 -0.03 1 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 Table 3 is produced to present the correlation matrix of the variables before 
conducting the econometric estimations. As all absolute values are less than 0.6, no 
multicollinearity is expected in the model. To give a visual representation, correlation 
matrix heatmap is depicted in Figure 6.  
 
 
3.3. Methodology 
 Because the aim is to analyze the relationship between bribery and all types 
of innovation, four different equations are estimated. Since the dependent variables 
are binary (see Table 1), considering previous literature, probit model is preferred 
over OLS model.  
 Analytical expressions of the regressions are as follows: 
Pr(𝑌𝑘,𝑖𝑗 = 1) = 𝐹(𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗 +  𝜆2𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜆3I𝑗 + 𝜆4C𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗)                  
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 where F is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution, 𝑌𝑘,𝑖𝑗 is dependent variable where (k=1,…,4): Product, Process, 
Marketing and Organizational Innovation. Bribesi,j is the main explanatory variable, 
Xi,j  is a set of control explanatory variables, such as firm size, firm age, firm’s 
financial limitations, firm’s threat perception of informal competition, education extent 
of firm’s employees, trainings provided to employees, firm’s ownership type, firm 
manager’s gender and experience in the sector, senior management’s time spent on 
dealing with regulations. Indices i and j are read as firm i in country j. Ij and Cj  denote 
industry and country dummies which capture industry and country fixed effects, 
respectively.     
 Regressions will be run for the FSU region firstly, then for each country group 
within the region particularly.  
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis and Results 
 Results of probit model estimations for the overall FSU region are shown in 
Table 4. It can be seen that bribery, defined as a form of corruption, is positively 
associated with all four innovation types in the FSU region. Such positive effect is 
statistically significant for product and marketing innovations at 1%, for 
organizational innovation at 5% and for process innovation at 10%. More specifically, 
1% increase in total annual sales payed as informal payment/gift, increases the 
probability of firms introducing product, process, marketing and/or organizational 
innovations. This positive relationship is not totally unexpected and can be justified 
by the unsatisfactory level of institutions in the overall region in which countries are 
in transition period. In such environments, public bodies tend to have greater control 
over resources which are crucial to innovate, and this fact provides an opportunity 
to them to extract bribes from firms. The Soviet legacy and its resulting misperception 
of corruption in the region leads to easily involvement of firms in corrupt activities to 
access the underlying resources.  
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Table 4. Probit model estimations for the full sample. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Product Innovation Process Innovation Marketing Innovation Organizational Innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bribes 0.016*** 0.010* 0.015*** 0.010** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Informal Competition 0.148*** 0.232*** 0.115** 0.175*** 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) 
Financial Limitations 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.230*** 0.202*** 
 (0.052) (0.054) (0.051) (0.053) 
Firm Age 0.032 0.070** 0.006 0.013 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) 
Firm Size 0.128*** 0.117*** 0.107*** 0.171*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Foreign Ownership 0.240*** -0.020 0.401*** 0.280*** 
 (0.086) (0.094) (0.087) (0.089) 
Time Tax 0.001 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Training 0.395*** 0.448*** 0.445*** 0.444*** 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045) 
Management’s 
Expertise 
0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female Manager -0.218*** -0.179*** -0.131*** -0.167*** 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) 
Education 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
Constant -1.627*** -1.779*** -1.557*** -1.771*** 
 (0.193) (0.197) (0.190) (0.194) 
     
Observations 5,227 5,227 5,227 5,227 
Log Likelihood -2,364.556 -2,197.601 -2,403.737 -2,301.415 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,793.111 4,459.201 4,871.474 4,666.829 
Note: *p<0.1;  **p<0.05;  ***p<0.01 
 Source: Author’s calculations. 
  
 
 Moreover, companies may consider only short-term benefits of corruption and 
favor being involved in corrupt activities. Apart from that, firms usually are eager to 
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bring their innovations into the market immediately, and generally moderate 
institutions in the FSU region increase the level of bureaucracy which lags this 
process. Examples could be obtaining permits, licenses, patents, monetary credits 
and so on. In order to avoid such delays, companies prefer to use bribery as a tool 
to facilitate the process. Hence, our results support the “greasing the wheels of 
innovation” hypothesis and confirms that for the FSU region petty corruption 
facilitates all types of firm innovation. 
 Taking discussions further and focusing on the link between bribery and firm 
innovation in each particular country cluster within the FSU region, Table 5 presents 
results for countries of strong institutional structures.  
 
Table 5. Probit model estimations for the sample of countries with strong institutional 
structures. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Product Innovation Process Innovation Marketing Innovation Organizational Innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Bribes -0.158 0.016 -0.124 0.075* 
 (0.155) (0.042) (0.121) (0.040) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.216** -2.235*** -2.185*** -2.324*** 
 (0.557) (0.673) (0.685) (0.682) 
Observations 431 431 431 431 
Log Likelihood -214.577 -196.096 -186.965 -176.236 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 469.155 432.192 413.930 392.472 
 
Note: *p<0.1;  **p<0.05;  ***p<0.01 
Table is in shortened form. Full table is presented in appendices. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
   
 
26 
 From Table 5, it can be observed that bribery has statistically significant 
positive relationship only with organizational innovation in the EU member post-
Soviet countries. While it decreases the probability of introducing product and 
marketing innovations, these effects are statistically insignificant. Positive link 
between bribery and process innovation is also insignificant. Relationships between 
bribery and product, process and marketing innovations are not significant, because 
law enforcement is strong and government does not control critical resources for 
innovation unlike the overall FSU region. Possible explanation of the positive 
relationship with organizational innovation could again be the room for improvement 
in institutional structures. Although underlying cluster countries are the best in terms 
of institutional quality in the FSU region, they fall into countries with moderate 
institutions when compared to the rest of the world. So, there might be gaps in 
existing institutions which lead firms to use bribery as a tool to overcome those lags. 
For example, during the process of designing regulations public agents may face a 
dilemma between the best and the second best choices. As they do not always prefer 
the alternative that suits private agents best, the latter may favor the second best 
alternative through corruption as they might think that it suits them best 
(Mahagaonkar, 2010). This finding is inconsistent with the previous literature (Lee et 
al., 2020; Mahagaonkar, 2010) which report a negative link between corruption and 
organizational innovation. However, it should be noted that the latter studies report 
the negative link for countries with weak country-level governance which is not the 
case for the EU member post-Soviet countries. However, comprehensive analysis 
of the exact market conditions, legislations, national innovations systems and 
institutional structures of the underlying cluster countries might be conducted to 
reveal the insights of this conflict. 
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Table 6. Probit model estimations for the sample of countries with moderate institutional 
structures. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Product Innovation Process Innovation Marketing Innovation Organizational Innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Bribes 0.113* 0.024 0.035 -0.041 
 (0.063) (0.057) (0.054) (0.084) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.696*** -2.051*** -1.875*** -2.275*** 
 (0.493) (0.562) (0.503) (0.579) 
Observations 746 746 746 746 
Log Likelihood -279.437 -232.403 -268.287 -227.563 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 598.874 504.805 576.573 495.126 
 
Note: *p<0.1;  **p<0.05;  ***p<0.01 
 Table is in shortened form. Full table is presented in appendices. 
 Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 Table 6 shows results of estimations for the countries where institutional 
structures are of moderate quality.  It is seen that bribery greases the wheels of only 
product innovation in the underlying country cluster. It has positive relationships with 
process and marketing innovations and a negative relationship with organizational 
innovations, but these relationships are statistically insignificant. This indicates that 
institutions are strong enough in this country cluster to prevent the usage of bribery 
as a tool to “get things done” in the context of process, marketing and organizational 
innovations. Meanwhile, explanations for the positive links between firm innovation 
and petty corruption in the FSU region are valid for product innovation in the 
countries with moderate institutions. Firms use corruption as a tool to bypass 
bureaucratic procedures and take competitive advantage by bringing their products 
into the market as fast as possible. Moreover, uncertainty in the environment also 
leads to companies’ involvement in bribery. To clarify, corrupt firms can be certain 
28 
that their needed resources, permissions, licenses, patents, etc. will be granted them 
to bring their innovations into the market (Mahagaonkar, 2010). 
  
Table 7. Probit model estimations for countries with weak institutional structures. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Product Innovation Process Innovation Marketing Innovation Organizational Innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Bribes 0.016*** 0.010* 0.017*** 0.010* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.154*** -2.029*** -1.354*** -1.800*** 
 (0.236) (0.237) (0.219) (0.229) 
 
Observations 4,050 4,050 4,050 4,050 
Log Likelihood -1,850.245 -1,750.755 -1,932.533 -1,871.292 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,750.489 3,551.509 3,915.066 3,792.585 
Note: *p<0.1;  **p<0.05;  ***p<0.01 
 Table is in shortened form. Full table is presented in appendices. 
 Source: Author’s calculations. 
  
 Table 7 presents results of the analysis for the countries with weak 
institutional structures. Like the general FSU region, bribery increases the likelihood 
of all innovation types in this country cluster, as well. Justifications for all positive 
links between bribery and firm innovation in the general FSU region and group of 
countries with moderate institutions are valid in this case, as well. 
 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
 Firstly, the BEEPS V dataset used to run above given regressions included 
firms that reported bribes equal to and even more than 50% of their total annual 
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sales in a year. Such high percentages of bribes prompt a question that whether 
those firms are even in valid businesses. In order to address this issue, bribery 
outliers are removed from the dataset by filtering out firms which reported bribes 
higher than 20% of their total annual sales in a year. The filtered dataset includes 
5199 observations and the main regressions which is for the FSU region as a whole 
are redone by using the filtered dataset. Results reported in Table 8 show that bribery 
increases the odds of all innovation types in the FSU region. While positive 
relationships between bribery and product, process, marketing innovations are 
statistically significant at 1%, bribery’s positive association with organizational 
innovations is significant at 10%.    
  
Table 8. Robustness checks for the full sample by removing bribery outliers. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Product Innovation Process Innovation Marketing Innovation Organizational Innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bribes 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.015* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.639*** -1.786*** -1.564*** -1.775*** 
 (0.193) (0.197) (0.190) (0.194) 
Observations 5,199 5,199 5,199 5,199 
Log Likelihood -2,340.772 -2,176.192 -2,383.209 -2,281.361 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,745.543 4,416.384 4,830.418 4,626.722 
Note: *p<0.1;  **p<0.05;  ***p<0.01 
 Table is in shortened form. Full table is presented in appendices. 
 Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 Secondly, when corruption proxy is defined as the percentage of total annual 
sales paid as informal payment/gifts, reported figures by the firm managers might be 
inaccurate and biased, and thus not revealing the actual level of corruption in the 
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environment. To overcome this, another corruption proxy, namely “Corruption” is 
chosen from the BEEPS survey. It is obtained by considering answers of “How 
common is it for firms to have to pay some irregular “additional payments or gifts” to 
get things done with regards to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc.?”. 
Considering the secretive nature of corruption, answers “Never” and “Seldom” are 
coded as “0”, and answers “Sometimes”, “Frequently”, “Very frequently” and 
“Always” are coded as “1”. Given that, regressions for the FSU region are redone 
and estimation results are presented in Table 9.  
 
Table 9. Robustness checks for the full sample with a new “Corruption” proxy. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Product Innovation Process Innovation Marketing Innovation Organizational Innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Corruption 0.169*** 0.139*** 0.062 0.163*** 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.710*** -1.872*** -1.638*** -1.806*** 
 (0.187) (0.192) (0.185) (0.189) 
 
Observations 6,124 6,124 6,124 6,124 
Log Likelihood -2,825.792 -2,593.363 -2,823.174 -2,670.373 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,715.584 5,250.725 5,710.348 5,404.746 
Note: *p<0.1;  **p<0.05;  ***p<0.01 
 Table is in shortened form. Full table is presented in appendices. 
 Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 With the new proxy, corruption is still positively related to firm innovation and 
increases the odds of introducing product, process and organizational innovations. 
Underlying positive links are found to be statistically significant at 1%. The 
relationship between corruption and marketing innovation is also positive, but 
statistically insignificant.  
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6. Conclusion 
 Although considerable amount of literature has been devoted to analyzing 
corruption and innovation as determinants of economic growth, firm performance 
and productivity, the relationship between corruption and innovation has yet to reach 
a theoretical consensus. While the common view in the literature is that corruption 
hinders innovation by leading to misallocation of resources and decreasing 
investments in R&D and innovation activities, more and more empirical studies 
recently claim that it fosters innovation by being used by firms to overcome 
bureaucratic red tape, accelerate the processes of obtaining license and 
permissions, and secure contracts.  
 By using a cross-country firm-level data from BEEPS V, this study rejects the 
detrimental effect of corruption and supports the “greasing the wheels of innovation” 
hypothesis by confirming that bribery increases the probability of introducing 
innovation in the post-Soviet Region. It finds that bribery has a statistically significant 
positive effect on all four innovation types, namely product, process, marketing and 
organizational innovations, in the former Soviet region.  
 This study is unique in a sense of analyzing particularly the post-Soviet region 
which have been overlooked in the previous literature. Secondly, it also contributes 
to the limited literature by covering marketing and organizational innovations in 
addition to product and process innovations. 
 Thirdly, the study takes into account high heterogeneity in the region and 
groups post-Soviet countries considering their institutional qualities. To assess 
institutions of countries, the paper is elaborated with the WGI data from World Bank. 
As a result, it finds that in the EU member post-Soviet countries, namely Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania, bribery has a significant positive relationship only with 
organizational innovation. This indicates that while the level of institutions is good 
enough to prevent usage of bribery as a tool to facilitate product, process and 
marketing innovations, there still exists room for improvement of regulations to foster 
organizational innovation. In the countries of moderate institutional quality, namely 
Georgia, Armenia and Moldova, bribery greases the wheels of only product 
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innovation. No significant relationship is detected between bribery and process, 
marketing and organizational innovations in the underlying country cluster. Fight 
against corruption should be braced and relative institutions ought to be 
strengthened in this group of countries in order to eliminate bureaucratic hurdles 
which lead to the usage of bribery to accelerate product innovation. Eventually, 
bribery increases the likelihood of all four innovation types in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan. Because quality 
of institutional structures in these countries is poor and law enforcement is weak. 
Under these circumstances, bribery becomes necessary to bring innovations into the 
market and accelerate this process.  
 The current study has several limitations. First of all, as corruption is against 
“the rules of the game” and corrupt behaviors are illegal, it is hard to measure 
corruption accurately. Political atmosphere, level of freedom of speech in the focus 
region might affect respondents’ attitudes towards answering certain questions and 
they might be biased in reporting actual situation accurately. Moreover, there are 
many missing observations as respondents avoided to answer questions because 
of their sensitivity. Although BEEPS data provides some insights about the extent to 
which an environment is corrupt, it is not completely unbiased and there is a need 
for more accurate, objective and less perception-based data. In this sense, this 
research can be redone by using more precise and unbiased dataset afterwards.   
 Secondly, corruption might encourage innovation in a short term, but it might 
be detrimental for firm innovation in a long run. However, BEEPS consists of cross-
country data and is not panel-structured. Thus, it is not possible to observe how the 
relationship between firm innovation and corruption evolves over the years. Further 
works might be focused on long term effects of corruption and firm innovation. 
 Thirdly, the main focus of this paper is the relationship between petty 
corruption and firm innovation. Further focus can be given to the relationship 
between grand corruption and firm innovation.  
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6. Appendices 
 
Figure 1. Average institutional quality of the region countries during 1996-2016. 
Source: Author’s calculations & (The World Bank, n.d.). 
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Table 1. Detailed description of the variables. 
Variable Description Used in Studies 
Dependent 
variables 
  
Product 
Innovation 
Whether any new or significantly 
improved products or services were 
introduced in the last 3 years, 1 = “YES” 
(Goedhuys et al., 2016; 
Habiyaremye & Raymond, 
2018; Krastanova, 2014; 
Mahagaonkar, 2010; Trinh, 
2019; Waldemar, 2012; Xie 
et al., 2019) 
Process 
Innovation 
Whether any new or significantly 
improved methods for the production or 
the supply of products/services were 
introduced in the last 3 years, 1 = “YES” 
(Goedhuys et al., 2016; 
Krastanova, 2014; 
Mahagaonkar, 2010; 
Nguyen et al., 2016; Trinh, 
2019) 
Marketing 
Innovation 
Whether any new or significantly 
improved marketing methods were 
introduced in the last 3 years, 1 = “YES” 
(Goedhuys et al., 2016; 
Mahagaonkar, 2010) 
Organizational 
Innovation 
Whether any new or significantly 
improved organizational or management 
practices/structures were introduced in 
the last 3 years, 1 = “YES” 
(Goedhuys et al., 2016; 
Mahagaonkar, 2010) 
Independent 
variables 
  
Bribes Percentage of total annual sales paid as 
informal payment/gift 
(Fisman & Svensson, 2007; 
Krastanova, 2014; 
Mahagaonkar, 2010; 
Nguyen et al., 2016; Trinh, 
2019; Waldemar, 2012) 
Informal 
Competition 
Whether practices of informal 
competitors in the sector are major or 
severe obstacles to the current 
operations of a firm, 1 = if the answer is 
either “Major obstacle” or “Very severe 
obstacle” 
(Krastanova, 2014) 
Firm Size (log) Logarithm of the number of permanent, 
full time individuals working at the end 
of last fiscal year 
(Krastanova, 2014; Stock et 
al., 2002; Trinh, 2019) 
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Table continued 
Variable Description Used in Studies 
Firm Age (log) Logarithm of the number of years since 
the firm began to operate 
(Coad et al., 2016; Huergo 
& Jaumandreu, 2004; 
Krastanova, 2014; Trinh, 
2019) 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Foreign-owned company, if at least 10% 
of the company’s equity shares are 
owned by foreign individuals 
(Ashyrov & Masso, 2020; 
Feliciano & Doytch, 2017; 
Habiyaremye & Raymond, 
2018; Kimura & Kiyota, 
2007) 
Time Tax Percentage of senior management’s 
time spent on dealing with regulations 
(Xie et al., 2019; 
Zimmermann, 2007) 
Financial 
Limitations 
Whether Financial Limitations is a major 
or severe obstacle for firms, 1 = if the 
answer is either “Major obstacle” or 
“Very severe obstacle” 
(BEEPS | 2012-2016, n.d.; 
Krastanova, 2014; Trinh, 
2019) 
Training  Whether a firm had formal training 
programs for its permanent, full time 
employees over fiscal year, 1 = “YES” 
(Diebolt & Hippe, 2018; 
Toner, 2011) 
Education Percentage of full time employees who 
completed a university degree 
(Junge et al., 2012; 
Waldemar, 2012) 
Management’s 
Expertise 
Top manager’s number of years of 
experience working in this sector 
(Balsmeier & Czarnitzki, 
2014) 
Female 
Manager 
1 = if the main respondent’s gender is 
female 
(Christiansen et al., 2016; 
Dwyer et al., 2003) 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 6. Correlation matrix heatmap. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Average institutional quality in the FSU region during 2012-2016. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 5. Probit model estimations for the sample of countries with strong institutional structures. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Product Innovation Process Innovation 
Marketing 
Innovation 
Organizational 
Innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Bribes -0.158 0.016 -0.124 0.075* 
 (0.155) (0.042) (0.121) (0.040) 
Informal Competition 0.221 0.353* 0.524*** 0.687*** 
 (0.188) (0.193) (0.195) (0.197) 
Financial Limitations -0.272 -0.305 0.095 -0.023 
 (0.227) (0.237) (0.226) (0.235) 
Firm Age (logs) 0.085 0.188 0.161 0.192 
 (0.132) (0.140) (0.143) (0.152) 
Firm Size (logs) 0.103 0.157** 0.051 0.268*** 
 (0.070) (0.073) (0.076) (0.079) 
Time Tax 0.004 0.010* 0.003 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Training 0.499*** 0.374** 0.342** 0.319* 
 (0.153) (0.159) (0.163) (0.168) 
Management’s Expertise -0.017* -0.010 -0.005 -0.038*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
Female Manager 0.009 -0.053 -0.238 0.037 
 (0.149) (0.154) (0.161) (0.164) 
Education 0.001 0.005* 0.007** 0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.216** -2.235*** -2.185*** -2.324*** 
 (0.557) (0.673) (0.685) (0.682) 
Observations 431 431 431 431 
Log Likelihood -214.577 -196.096 -186.965 -176.236 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 469.155 432.192 413.930 392.472 
 
Note: *p<0.1;  **p<0.05;  ***p<0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 6. Probit model estimations for the sample of countries with moderate institutional 
structures. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Product Innovation Process Innovation Marketing Innovation Organizational Innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Bribes 0.113* 0.024 0.035 -0.041 
 (0.063) (0.057) (0.054) (0.084) 
Informal Competition 0.434*** 0.489*** 0.339** 0.311* 
 (0.154) (0.162) (0.158) (0.169) 
Financial Limitations 0.286* 0.234 0.570*** 0.314* 
 (0.155) (0.174) (0.151) (0.171) 
Firm Age (logs) 0.097 0.230** 0.166 0.186 
 (0.106) (0.114) (0.110) (0.118) 
Firm Size (logs) 0.075 0.038 0.152*** 0.172*** 
 (0.055) (0.060) (0.055) (0.059) 
Time Tax 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.0002 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Training 0.641*** 0.641*** 0.843*** 0.785*** 
 (0.143) (0.154) (0.142) (0.149) 
Management’s Expertise -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Female Manager 0.085 0.109 -0.290** -0.056 
 (0.130) (0.140) (0.137) (0.143) 
Education 0.003 0.0001 0.0005 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.696*** -2.051*** -1.875*** -2.275*** 
 (0.493) (0.562) (0.503) (0.579) 
Observations 746 746 746 746 
Log Likelihood -279.437 -232.403 -268.287 -227.563 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 598.874 504.805 576.573 495.126 
 
Note: *p<0.1;  **p<0.05;  ***p<0.01 
 Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 7. Probit model estimations for the sample of countries with weak institutional structures. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Product Innovation Process Innovation Marketing Innovation Organizational Innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Bribes 0.016*** 0.010* 0.017*** 0.010* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Informal Competition 0.086 0.177*** 0.038 0.091 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) 
Financial Limitations 0.172*** 0.174*** 0.194*** 0.200*** 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.057) (0.057) 
Firm Age (logs) 0.015 0.042 -0.025 -0.014 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) 
Firm Size (logs) 0.150*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.180*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
Time Tax 0.001 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Training 0.364*** 0.442*** 0.422*** 0.429*** 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049) 
Management’s Expertise 0.004 0.003 -0.003 -0.0002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female Manager -0.292*** -0.232*** -0.098* -0.201*** 
 (0.052) (0.054) (0.050) (0.052) 
Education 0.004*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.154*** -2.029*** -1.354*** -1.800*** 
 (0.236) (0.237) (0.219) (0.229) 
 
Observations 4,050 4,050 4,050 4,050 
Log Likelihood -1,850.245 -1,750.755 -1,932.533 -1,871.292 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,750.489 3,551.509 3,915.066 3,792.585 
Note: *p<0.1;  **p<0.05;  ***p<0.01 
 Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 8. Robustness checks for the full sample by removing bribery outliers. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Product 
Innovation 
Process Innovation 
Marketing 
Innovation 
Organizational Innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bribes 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.015* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Informal Competition 0.158*** 0.239*** 0.113** 0.178*** 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Financial Limitations 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.233*** 0.200*** 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.052) (0.053) 
Firm Age (logs) 0.032 0.068** 0.004 0.012 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) 
Firm Size (logs) 0.132*** 0.122*** 0.111*** 0.174*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Foreign Ownership 0.241*** -0.023 0.392*** 0.271*** 
 (0.087) (0.094) (0.088) (0.089) 
Time Tax 0.001 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Training 0.391*** 0.443*** 0.441*** 0.442*** 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045) 
Management’s Expertise 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female Manager -0.209*** -0.177*** -0.128*** -0.161*** 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) 
Education 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.639*** -1.786*** -1.564*** -1.775*** 
 (0.193) (0.197) (0.190) (0.194) 
Observations 5,199 5,199 5,199 5,199 
Log Likelihood -2,340.772 -2,176.192 -2,383.209 -2,281.361 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,745.543 4,416.384 4,830.418 4,626.722 
Note: *p<0.1;  **p<0.05;  ***p<0.01 
 Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 9. Robustness checks for the full sample with a new “Corruption” proxy. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Product Innovation Process Innovation Marketing Innovation Organizational Innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Corruption 0.169*** 0.139*** 0.062 0.163*** 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) 
Informal Competition 0.130** 0.194*** 0.081 0.167*** 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053) 
Financial Limitations 0.144*** 0.148*** 0.243*** 0.194*** 
 (0.047) (0.049) (0.047) (0.048) 
Firm Age (logs) 0.022 0.054* 0.014 0.008 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) 
Firm Size (logs) 0.144*** 0.128*** 0.102*** 0.169*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Foreign Ownership 0.264*** 0.057 0.384*** 0.233*** 
 (0.081) (0.087) (0.082) (0.084) 
Time Tax 0.002 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Training 0.378*** 0.469*** 0.475*** 0.447*** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) 
Management’s Expertise 0.003 0.004* -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female Manager -0.197*** -0.152*** -0.119*** -0.153*** 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.043) 
Education 0.003*** 0.001* 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.710*** -1.872*** -1.638*** -1.806*** 
 (0.187) (0.192) (0.185) (0.189) 
 
Observations 6,124 6,124 6,124 6,124 
Log Likelihood -2,825.792 -2,593.363 -2,823.174 -2,670.373 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,715.584 5,250.725 5,710.348 5,404.746 
Note: *p<0.1;  **p<0.05;  ***p<0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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